Why the Ukrainian conflict is not all about Putin

Putin, World Economic Forum 2009On 15 February 2015 a ceasefire was to come into effect between the Ukrainian government and the rebels fighting for the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR). Dr Matthew Davies believed the ceasefire would not last because it did not advantage Vladimir Putin.1 As President of Russia, Putin holds influence with the DPR, and indeed is perceived by many as being behind their rebellion. According to Davies, the Ukrainian conflict has ‘never been about Ukraine, or even about territory that Putin thinks should be integrated into Russia [but] about the hurt honour of a country and a leader who want to be considered important. The conflict has been about perception.’ The narrative that the Ukrainian conflict is all about Putin is a common one in Western media, and is repeatedly used to explain the conflict.

I disagree with the narrative that the Ukrainian conflict is all about Putin. Rather, I think his actions are in the interests of Russia and are a defensive strategy in the face of threatening actions from the United States and Europe. To put it simply, I believe Putin is acting in defence of Russia. Below I will explain why.

For the purpose of this analysis I will adopt two assumptions commonly held by Western media:

  1. That Putin has complete strategic control over the DPR forces, or their interests align so perfectly as to be indivisible.
  2. That Putin has complete control over Russia, including its government and all ministries and services. As is Western media fashion, I will therefore use ‘Putin’ as shorthand for ‘the Russian government.’

Note that I do not actually agree with these assumptions.

What does Putin want?

A brief look at Western media provides four motivations driving Putin in Ukraine:

Rebuild Imperial Russia or the USSR

The motivation most commonly attributed to Putin is his desire to rebuild Russia into either the Russian Empire or the USSR. According to this theory, Putin seeks to expand Russia’s borders to encompass all those lands once under Russian rule (which includes Ukraine). He dreams ‘of resurrecting the glories of Imperial Russia,’2 which will ‘avenge the historic humiliation… that was the collapse of the Soviet Union.’3 Accordingly, Putin is attempting to rebuild the Russian Empire by ‘bludgeoning former Soviet states into submission, whether through energy blackmail, trade embargoes or war.’4

According to this theory Putin’s imperial motivation stems from two simple facts—that he is a former agent in the KGB and an avowed nationalist.5

Destroy the West

Another oft-cited goal of Putin is to destroy the United States of America and/or Europe. This motivator is used to sell the threat of Russia to Western audiences. This is supported by the commonly stated fact that he annexed Crimea by force – even though the people held a referendum to join Russia.6 According to the Economist, Putin wants ‘a wretched little quasi-state in the Donbas, which he can use to stall and warp Ukraine’s development.’7 But Putin’s appetite won’t be sated just on the Crimea. ‘Sooner or later it may encompass the Baltic states—members of both the European Union and NATO.’8 And beyond the Baltic states, apparently the big prize is wrenching Germany out of NATO.9 Finally, the narrative states that the whole European Union is Putin’s ultimate target. 10

Stay in power

Perhaps the weakest argument explaining Putin’s actions is his desire to stay in power. ‘He’s got to do what he’s got to do to stay in power, probably for life, if necessary by whipping Russians into nationalist frenzy. And he wants to have a lot of fun while doing all of it.’ 11 In the face of falling oil prices and economic hardship in Russia, this theme has Putin requiring war to help justify his autocratic regime.12

Clash of ideas

The final argument for Putin’s actions is the clash of ideas theory, that Putin’s view of the world is incompatible with the West (and by extension the rest of the world). In the Economist’s view, on one side of this clash of ideas ‘are human rights, an accountable bureaucracy and democratic elections; on the other an unconstrained state that can sacrifice its citizens’ interests to further its destiny or satisfy its rulers’ greed.’13 With this theory, Western values and institutions are even more threatening to Putin than armies.14 The overarching message in this theme is that ‘a permanent modus vivendi with the West is impossible… Russia must forever be its own master in a world of competing great powers, each with its own sphere of influence.’15 But according to Davies this is fine with Putin as ‘Russia does not want to be liked, it does not want to be friends and it does not want to be brought into the western club.’16

What Putin actually wants

In my opinion Putin wants what any other leader should want: the best for his country. He wants Russia to have a strong economy, and for its people to live in safety and peace. The problem with this is that a strong, independent Russia is not desired by the West. This is where conflict between Putin and the West occurs.

Western designs on Russia

The West has long desired a weak or contained Russia. The Great Game in the late 19th century, for example, was a strategic rivalry and conflict between the British and Russian Empires for supremacy in Central Asia, played to prevent Russia from obtaining a port on the Indian Ocean. Russia (and then the USSR) was briefly allied with Great Britain in World War 1 and again in World War 2. However, during the Cold War which followed, the main objective of the West was to limit the USSR’s expansion and influence by any means possible short of nuclear war.

After the Cold War and the fall of the USSR, the West, in the form of NATO, began expanding east. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined in 1999. In following years, much of eastern Europe joined, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, then Albania and Croatia in 2009. Russia was too weak at the time to halt NATO’s expansion.

NATO expansion
NATO expansion

In 2008 NATO declared that Georgia and Ukraine will be admitted into the alliance. Both countries shared borders with Russia. At the time, Putin stated that admitting the two countries would represent a “direct threat” to Russia. Indeed, Russia fought a short war with Georgia in 2008 when that country tried to reincorporate two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian forces took control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, making it clear that Georgia would not be part of NATO.

The Western threat

Given recent history it is not surprising that Putin perceives the West as a threat to Russia and is acting accordingly. To Putin, the USA and its allies consider themselves winners of the Cold War and wish to ‘impose their will everywhere.’17 Putin affirmed Russia will not live in this condition of semi-occupation.18

Putin also perceives the EU and NATO as American tools used to gain influence over the rest of the world.19 ‘Promises of non-expansion of NATO to the east have turned out to be hollow statements,’ he said in response to the agreements reached between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1989.20 Russia perceives NATO as such a threat that their newly signed military doctrine has an explicit focus on the organisation as Russia’s main external threat, stating that it is ‘undermining global stability and violating the balance of power in the nuclear-missile sphere.’21 Where the West sees an aggressive Russia, Putin sees himself as defending Russia against the Western threat.

The Ukrainian conflict

The Ukrainian conflict did not begin because of Putin desiring to rebuild Imperial Russia or some anti-Western sentiment. Putin perceived the West encroaching into Russis’s ‘backyard.’ Although Ukraine applied to join NATO in 2008, the plans were shelved two years later with the election of President Yanukovych. In 2013 the US threw their support behind (or perhaps engineered) a change of government, starting with the Euromaidan protests and culminating in a coup which replaced pro-Russian Yanukovych for Pro-western Porohsenko. The US offered $25 billion to prop up the flailing Ukrainian economy and to place missile defences on the Russian border22 This shifted the balance of power in the region toward the USA. Putin rightly considered this Western interference in Russia’s security, with the prospect of putting a hostile alliance directly on Russia’s borders unacceptable.23 It was a red line which could not be crossed (consider the USSR locating nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962 for an example of a similar red line for the US). Putin had to act or jeopardise Russia’s security.

Considering this, Putin sees the conflict in Ukraine as instigated by the West because it has forced him to throw his support behind the Ukrainian rebels. He sees the fighting not as a cause of conflict with the West but as a consequence.24 Even without Ukraine, Putin believes the West would have found some other excuse to contain Russia.25 This is the real motivation of Putin: not to rebuild Imperial Russia, or destroy the West, but, in the face of Western provocation, to protect Russia’s sovereignty.

Conclusion

Western journalists assign various motivations to Putin’s actions in Ukraine, from wanting to rebuild Imperial Russia to wanting war to ensconce his own power. What is missing from these theories is context – the actions of the USA and Europe are rarely mentioned. Every theory portrays Putin as the instigator and the West and its allies as victims. For example, an article in the Economist is titled ‘Putin’s War on the West.’

The unspoken assumption is the West is almost a bystander, only defending itself or protecting the world from Russia; if the West responds with sanctions or military escalation it is always for defensive reasons, with Putin leaving them no choice. Likewise, when stating that Putin wants war to strengthen his regime in the face of economic hardship, what isn’t mentioned is that much of Russia’s ‘economic hardship’ is caused by Western-led sanctions. Hence there is a circular argument that Putin needs war in response to sanctions, and that sanctions are in response to Putin’s aggression. But again, the West’s actions are not mentioned.

The West seeks to dominate Russia, or failing that contain it through sanctions and isolation. It has repeatedly provoked Russia and threatened its security. Despite the claims of Western journalists, Putin is acting rationally, attempting to preserve Russia’s security and sovereignty. The war in Ukraine is therefore not a consequence of Putin’s imperial ambitions, but is the latest crisis in the long-standing conflict between Russia and the West.

If this theory is accepted, the real question becomes why Western journalists disguise this fact behind the fanciful excuses listed above. I believe this is primarily to cover up the West’s provocations by blaming the victim – how can the West be a bastion for freedom, peace and democracy yet instigate armed conflicts at the same time? This obfuscation occurs every time the West launches wars of aggression, when the official narrative, parroted by Western journalists, is that the West is “reluctantly” pulled into war. Examples include the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the bombing of Libya in 2011, and attempts to sell an attack on Iran.

Until these journalists are called out and the facts exposed, the West will be free to carry out their imperial aggression under the cover of blaming their opposition.

Related reading:

Clark N 2015, ‘Forget all our other troubles – the Russians are coming!’, RT, 24 Feb 2015, http://rt.com/op-edge/235075-russian-threat-jets-defense/

Mearsheimer J 2014, ‘Why the Ukraine crisis in the West’s fault’, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault

Show 25 footnotes

  1. Davies M 2015, ‘The Ukraine ceasefire plan is a Russian victory’, ABC, 13 Feb 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-13/davies-the-ukraine-ceasefire-plan-is-a-russian-victory/6092270
  2. Bender J 2015, ‘This is the simplest explanation of why Putin is so opposed to NATO’, Business Insider Australia, 13 Feb 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com.au/simplest-explanation-of-why-putin-hates-nato-2015-2
  3. Stephens B 2014, ‘What does Vladimir Putin want?’, Wall Street Journal, 8 Sept 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/bret-stephens-what-does-vladimir-putin-want-1410218201
  4. The Economist 2015a, ‘Putin’s war on the West’, The Economist, 12 Feb 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643189-ukraine-suffers-it-time-recognise-gravity-russian-threatand-counter
  5. Bender J 2015, ‘This is the simplest explanation of why Putin is so opposed to NATO’, Business Insider Australia, 13 Feb 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com.au/simplest-explanation-of-why-putin-hates-nato-2015-2
  6. The Economist 2015a, ‘Putin’s war on the West’, The Economist, 12 Feb 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643189-ukraine-suffers-it-time-recognise-gravity-russian-threatand-counter
  7. The Economist 2015a, ‘Putin’s war on the West’, The Economist, 12 Feb 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643189-ukraine-suffers-it-time-recognise-gravity-russian-threatand-counter
  8. The Economist 2015a, ‘Putin’s war on the West’, The Economist, 12 Feb 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643189-ukraine-suffers-it-time-recognise-gravity-russian-threatand-counter
  9. Stephens P 2015, ‘The short telegram about Vladimir Putin’s Russia’, FT, 19 Feb 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4e759a04-b773-11e4-8807-00144feab7de.html#axzz3SEvtefc9
  10. The Economist 2015a, ‘Putin’s war on the West’, The Economist, 12 Feb 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643189-ukraine-suffers-it-time-recognise-gravity-russian-threatand-counter
  11. Stephens B 2014, ‘What does Vladimir Putin want?’, Wall Street Journal, 8 Sept 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/bret-stephens-what-does-vladimir-putin-want-1410218201
  12. Chance M 2015, ‘What does Russia’s President Putin really want?’, CNN, 11 Feb 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/11/world/chance-putin-analysis/
  13. The Economist 2015b, ‘What Russia wants: From cold war to hot war’, The Economist, 14 Feb 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation
  14. The Economist 2015a, ‘Putin’s war on the West’, The Economist, 12 Feb 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643189-ukraine-suffers-it-time-recognise-gravity-russian-threatand-counter
  15. Stephens P 2015, ‘The short telegram about Vladimir Putin’s Russia’, FT, 19 Feb 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4e759a04-b773-11e4-8807-00144feab7de.html#axzz3SEvtefc9
  16. Davies M 2015, ‘The Ukraine ceasefire plan is a Russian victory’, ABC, 13 Feb 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-13/davies-the-ukraine-ceasefire-plan-is-a-russian-victory/6092270
  17. Chance M 2015, ‘What does Russia’s President Putin really want?’, CNN, 11 Feb 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/11/world/chance-putin-analysis/
  18. Business Insider 2015, ‘Putin: “There’s no war, thank God.”’, Business Insider, 7 Feb 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-putin-criticises-sanctions-but-says-russia-does-not-want-war-2015-2?IR=T
  19. The Economist 2015b, ‘What Russia wants: From cold war to hot war’, The Economist, 14 Feb 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation
  20. Chance M 2015, ‘What does Russia’s President Putin really want?’, CNN, 11 Feb 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/11/world/chance-putin-analysis/
  21. Bender J 2015, ‘Russia’s new military doctrine shows Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions’, Business Insider Australia, 13 Jan 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com.au/russia-has-a-new-military-doctrine-2015-1
  22. The Economist 2015b, ‘What Russia wants: From cold war to hot war’, The Economist, 14 Feb 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation
  23. RT 2015, ‘Putin’s main interest – survival of Russia’, RT, 13 Feb 2015, http://rt.com/op-edge/232003-ukraine-minsk-talks-russia-ceasefire/
  24. The Economist 2015b, ‘What Russia wants: From cold war to hot war’, The Economist, 14 Feb 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation
  25. The Economist 2015b, ‘What Russia wants: From cold war to hot war’, The Economist, 14 Feb 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation

Leave a comment